Porous Protest and Rhetorical Performance: Democratic Transformation at Occupy by Millette, HollyGale
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 16
Issue 1 Philosophy of Democracy Article 4
January 2015
Porous Protest and Rhetorical Performance:
Democratic Transformation at Occupy
HollyGale Millette
University of Southampton
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Millette, HollyGale (2015) "Porous Protest and Rhetorical Performance: Democratic Transformation at Occupy," Essays in Philosophy:
Vol. 16: Iss. 1, Article 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1520
Porous Protest and Rhetorical
Performance: Democratic
Transformation at Occupy
PorousProtest|Millette
HollyGale Millette
University of Southampton
Abstract
What follows considers whether harnessing word (argument)
and action (occupation) constitutes a transformative democratic
performance. In this, I am not seeking to replace the Aris-
totelian concept of performance, nor its transformative aspect,
but I do ask how appropriate it is to confine mimetic acts of
protest to an Aristotelian dialectic. The “efficacy debate” is a
central issue for practitioners and scholars of political perfor-
mancei and I shall not question the truth of such claims that
to be a performance the event must transform its audience in
some way. Rather, I question, as others haveii, the ability for the
performance of protest to effect any kind of political change.
My argument is that Occupy’s politics emerge out of its perfor-
mance of rhetorical devices and strategies that put democracy
on display.
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POROUS PUBLICS AND VIRTUOUS RHETORIC
T he Greeks argued that everything was up for debate and that everything wasrelative to ones own situation and determination. As Protagoras apparently
43
said: “Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that [or ‘how’] they
are, and of things that are not, that [or ‘how’] they are not.”iii This Man-Mea-
sure statement is best explained in Plato’s Theaetetus.iv Protagoras emphasizes
how human subjectivity determines the way we understand and construct our
world; judgments about qualities and abstractions—pain, for example – are there-
fore subjective. In the same way, the dispute of “the 99%” that Occupy claimed
to represent (their slogan “We are the 99%” references wealth inequality in the
Global North and was arrived collectivelyv), can also be seen as many disputes,
determined by the relativity of the participant. Each dispute is relative to each
participant who raises them; each dispute also occupies the same stage and none
is judged as more significant than any other; arguments are as important as they
are to each person who experiences them. Protagoras’ statement forms the foun-
dations of relativism as a mature theory. It is this theoretical positioning that gives
the Occupy Movement its porosity.
I use the word “porosity” or “porous” as it is found in material science. Its key
to my argument on publics is its aspect of void measurement or what in art could
be called its negative space. In material science, objects with a high negative void
or negative space are more accommodating and thus more permeable, with high
acceptance of flow or fluidity. I use porosity to define the Occupy Movement as a
sponge-like ideological and physical construction that is similarly open. Thus, the
dispute that Occupy claims to represent can be seen as many disputes: it can be
the anger of the pensioner over fuel poverty; or the disillusion of the graduate stu-
dent over an empty future. The Royal Court’s production of Anders Lustgarden’s
play If You Don’t Let us Dream, We Wont Let You Sleep, was a dramaturgical
memorialisation of the porosity of the Occupy movement. The play—a distilla-
tion of the constitution and ideology of the protest—included: a 1970’s activist; a
pensioner who cannot afford her gas bill; a disenfranchised city worker; an out of
work graduate; an economics post-graduate; and an angry unemployed youth all
gathering to protest on the same platform but for different reasons. Such a model
is democratic and porous in form and, I argue, its rhetoric draws from virtue in
the tradition of moralists. This poses a methodological problem in that, as Warner
describes,vi the way we have been pre-conditioned to understand the presentation
and reception of speechifying of, in and with publics, is informed and dependent
on the subject’s engagement with that very public.
Occupy was set in motion by a group of people in New York in 2011 who
felt neglected when it came to expressing their situation within in the global fi-
nancial crisis. David Graebervii records the first email he received on the 3rd of
August to alert him to something “strange” happening near the big bull sculpture
near the New York Stock Exchange. The numbers grew, and less than a month
later the protesters moved to Zuccotti Park, a public square within shouting dis-
tance of City Hall. Quite quickly, London followed suit and protesters attempted
to occupy Paternoster Square outside the City’s Stock Exchange in protest of the
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current capitalist regime. They were pushed a few hundred yards left and onto the
steps of St Paul’s Cathedral—a wise placement as this insinuated the Church into
an argument largely constituted as a moral one. On 26 October 2011, an initial
statement—a Manifesto—was collectively agreed upon by the first 500 people
involved in the Occupation:
1. The current system is unsustainable. It is undemocratic and unjust. We
need alternatives; this is where we work towards them.
2. We are of all ethnicities, backgrounds, genders, generations, sexualities
dis/abilities and faiths. We stand together with occupations all over the
world.
3. We refuse to pay for the banks’ crisis.
4. We do not accept the cuts as either necessary or inevitable. We demand an
end to global tax injustice and our democracy representing corporations
instead of the people.
5. We want regulators to be genuinely independent of the industries they reg-
ulate.
6. We support the strike on the 30th November and the student action on the
9th November, and actions to defend our health services, welfare, educa-
tion and employment, and to stop wars and arms dealing.
7. We want structural change towards authentic global equality. The world’s
resources must go towards caring for people and the planet, not the mili-
tary, corporate profits or the rich.
8. The present economic system pollutes land, sea and air, is causing massive
loss of natural species and environments, and is accelerating humanity to-
wards irreversible climate change. We call for a positive, sustainable
economic system that benefits present and future generations. [added 19
November 2011].
9. We stand in solidarity with the global oppressed and we call for an end to
the actions of our government and others in causing this oppression.
10. This is what democracy looks like. Come and join us!viii
Their goal was to share their doubt, fear, outrage and worries on matters of public
importance with others. The behaviour and participation of Occupyists offered
a provocative form of education and public philosophy. In this context, public
philosophy refers to doing philosophy with general audiences in a non-academic
setting. The Learning-Tents erected outside of St. Paul’s Cathedral, for example,
were offered to everyone as places of self-discovery and revelation—a variegated
public space for learning to happen via discourse and assembly.
Their view on education is similar to the Sophists in Plato’s Protagoras.
Sophists were originally associated with a rational and critical attitude that was
widely unwelcomed by the conservative Greeks of the day, as the implications
of their arguments dismantled opinions. Plato records that they developed tax-
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onomies of speech acts – assertion, question, answer, and command—that are
widely associated with political rhetoric and the art of argumentation.ix Callias,
a Sophist in whose house the dialogue is set, has an anarchic view of politics,
in which he advocates that everyone should do according to his nature. “In this
view,” as Cohen observed, “education is a haphazard affair in which some learn,
others do not, and all at their own pace, in their own style, and at their own discre-
tion.”x This role-play is provocative as it emphasises not what is being learned,
but the socially democratic nature of collective learning. “All voices will be heard
in rational deliberation” and “the force of the better argument” could be borne
out such that “unjust social situations could be [rhetorically] corrected.”xi In line
with Habermas’ theoretical conceptions of ideal speech,xii “all affected partici-
pants [should] be included in deliberation, as it is only through the inclusion of
all those who may be affected that all interests are heard.”xiii
PERFORMING CARNIVAL, RHETORIC AND TRANSFORMATION
Occupyists became a moveable feast of pop-up anti-authoritarian clashes that
employed irony and play in their convening of tactical, porous flash-mobs. Re-
gional occupations, university occupations and occupations of public libraries
facing closure were all repetitive examples of the Movement as performed in this
way. In this paradigm, participants seemed to freeze-frame or converge as a liv-
ing tableau whose liquidity of motion translated, rhetorically, as a response to
the current hegemony. I see this as connected to Carnival in form. To me, Carni-
val describes an ad-hoc, moving parade of provocation, not merely the costumed
spectacle that (for example) the Notting Hill Carnival has become. A “carnival,”
as Crichlow and Armstrong note, “precipitates political and economic ques-
tions, on the one hand with a view to scrutinizing (top-down) state interventions
and impositions, and, on the other, with bottom-up or horizontal carnivalesque
subversions and general manoeuvres.”xiv The performance aesthetic of protest
at Occupy was more contingent on rhetorical carnival and the opening up of
porous spaces of knowledge than on bodily performance or, for example, a salsa
rhythm. It is deliberately anti-authoritarian and disruptive and easily lent itself to
a movement identified as global, anti-corporate and anti-authoritarian. What this
exemplifies is an aesthetic of rhetoric that performs (to both its constituents and
spectators) as a redemptive and authentic inversion of the capitalist system.
There was an exchangeability of repetition in the movement that Žižek refer-
enced from Hegel,xv but Marx patently underwrote it. “The social world created
by capitalism,” wrote Policante, imbricating his thought with forms and props of
performance, “could be compared to a spelled carnival in which dwell not men
but masks of men.”xvi As opposed to the human subjects behind the masks of
Carnival (as, for example, described by Bakhtinxvii) the subjects behind the Guy
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Fawkes Anonymous mask (also seen in Moore and Lloyd’s comic serial V, for
Vendettaxviii) perform on the “economic stage” as “personifications of economic
relations.”xix This Mask is one of many props adopted spontaneously and prolif-
erates as a symbol of “self-knowing, carnivalesque, festive citizenship.”xx I think
that the use of the mask performing a (direct) representation of an early Eng-
lish plot (or the ideology of a 1980’s comic book) is an example of an aesthetic
rhetoric that has become unmoored. As Jones first observed: “The stylised face of
the Fawkes mask [at Occupy] resembles the monstrous and bizarre faces of papier
mache, carved wood or leather donned by revelers at carnivals and masquerades
in early modern Europe … when the world turned upside down, when the rules
of society were mocked.”xxi Performance with the mask does not allude to any in-
tention sought by its wearer to leave behind a solution to the Marxist conundrum
of capitalism. Rather, it is a precisely appropriate Carnival Masque that punctu-
ates and resituates the inconsistencies of capitalist subjectivities in the occupied
space. Its rhetorical function is to perform “[t]he jaunty tension between is and
ought, being and becoming [and it] allows an aesthetic gaze to slip undetected
into a political one.”xxii Between present and future, actuality and possibility, a
democratic transformation must take place that overturns some prevailing con-
straint and installs a different array of forces.
The rhetoric of popular protest is such that the campaign or the occupation
performs as the voice of “the people” united—or at least the non-ruling, non-or-
ganised, silent majority. This voice has no particular mandate. Its appeal is to
fairness and to the emotionally authentic strength of feeling that arises from the
public. It is, as Rousseauxxiii famously put it, the expression of the general will
that can be realised as the participatory form of civic virtue in a “conscience
collective.”xxiv Civic virtue, which we can trace back to Aristotle, is a perfor-
mance of morality and a public and communal enterprise: “It is realised by the
active and continual participation of collective members in communal affairs.”xxv
This differs starkly from political legitimacy, which is (in neoliberalism) ulti-
mately tied to “stakeholders” with vested interests and the markets propped up
by those that govern. (I imply Foucaultxxvi here in using the term neoliberalism to
reference the post-Fordism discourse on what ways politics, late-capitalism, and
culture shifted subjectivities away from the citizen-centred model in favour of the
market-centred model.) When politicians express an interest (if they do) in the ef-
fects that their decisions have, their response is couched in the rhetoric of “moral
sentiment,” which Seligman explainsxxvii is externalised as subjectivity and is,
therefore, the impetus for the internal corruption of virtue. This, Bryant reminds
us, is a learned strategy of “manners, education and cultivation, which enjoins re-
spect for the sensibilities of others”xxviii but is subject to external pressures—or,
in the neoliberal paradigm, to the respect and sensibilities of the Market.
It was personal and communal authenticity of feeling that was so clearly
visible at Occupy—feelings that were both passionate and part of the social imag-
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inary. Chantal Mouffe speaks of this culture of affect as it intersects with politics
and construes it as a way for the polis to conceive of hope: “When you introduce
this notion of a social imaginary, it implies that you are leaving the rationalist
perspective behind. The term ‘passion’ is some kind of place holder for all those
things that cannot be reduced to interest or rationality – you know, fantasies, de-
sire, all those things that a rationalist approach is unable to understand in the
very construction of human subjectivity and identity.”xxix As if in answer to this,
one placard at St. Pauls blared: “This is the 1st time I have felt hopeful in a very
long time.” Occupying public sites became an occasion for the socialization of
the body politic in a world in which the polis had been eradicated as a body; it
provided a space to perform passion and hope. My argument is that this specific
blend of rhetoric did two things: 1) it handed moral authority back to the public
and, 2) it behaved as redemptive rhetoric, because words imbued with moral au-
thority are the voice of “truth.”
As in the world of theatre, the role played by Occupyists may be viewed as
the locus of conflicting energies: alone, each voice had subjective relativity; to-
gether, the communal voice had a sophistry. Examples of this were the props of
transmission that Occupy employed, such as a device known as the Human Mi-
crophone, for example, in which speechmakers were rather crudely hoisted onto
a raised platform in front of protesters who repeated their words in unison as a
means of both amplification and ownership. Taking Judith Butler’s orationxxx as a
case in point, the reader can deconstruct the call and repeat mechanism as being a
method of sophistic argumentation, in that first the orator decides for herself what
she wants to say and then she delivers that content to other persons who learn the
rhetoric themselves as they reiterate it.xxxi It is a bit reminiscent of double-voic-
ing in that it contains, on some level, an illicit mixing of what Bakhtinxxxii termed
“mésalliance.” That is to say, it hollows out the mechanism of speech used for
political pronouncements in order to fill it either with “truth” or with subversive
messages—as in enacted in a Carnival Mas. This repetition of words, could also
be seen as iteration, both in a theatrical—as in the Futurists and DaDaists model –
and in a dynamic systemic way—as in its functional heuristic form. Functionally,
it amplifies sound while activating aural learning, but on a psychosocial level,
as with Avant-garde theatre, it forces reflection on the means and the meanings
of that cultural production. Here, however, I relate the rhetorical performance of
the Human Microphone to mésalliance and, specifically, to the coda of the carni-
valesque that Bakhtin’s mésalliance carries. Ideologically, like Carnival, Occupy
“unmoors [the] performance and performers from constrained contingency and
liberates the body for insurrection without recourse to either misappropriation or
expropriation.”xxxiii Of course, Occupy could behave in no other way.
Yet, if a protest is both situated in the very thing it rails against and its
form is consciously open, it is unlikely that it will transform things in a material
sense. It will, however, shift the way debates are framed. If I use the Man-Mea-
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sure statement, as I have, to describe the relativism of “the 99%,” I must also
situate that 99% in the hegemony in which they have been born and raised.
That hegemony is, in point of fact, a neoliberal one that champions the in-
dividual—one in which everyone is individuated and morally responsive and
responsible to themselves. As Margaret Thatcher reminded Britain, by punc-
tuating the ideological truth that there was “no such thing as society,”xxxiv the
interface between the individual and society—sociology’s fundamental tool for
describing and analysing the behavioural interface—has become significantly
uncoupled by neo-liberalism. So, too, with the constitution of Occupy: “There
are no leaders, no spectators, no side-lines, only an entanglement of many play-
ers who do their own thing while feeling part of a greater whole.”xxxv So, the
Occupyist is both situated as neoliberal and also situated as railing against
that enforced hegemony. In this way, Occupy “exemplifies the anti-capital-
ist movement’s awareness and perhaps problematic appropriation/exchange of
oppositional culture and tactics.”xxxvi If a democratic societal transformation
needed to be wrought, it was not Occupy that would make it.
To be fair, however, nor did Occupy intend to make it. Looking again at the
Occupy manifesto, we see that their ten points begin with the words: “we need”;
“we are”; “we refuse”; “we do not”; “we want”; “we support”; “we call for”; and
“we stand in.”xxxvii, But there is no: “we will do” or “we will change.” These
words, albeit imbued with the collective “we,” are actually very neoliberal; they
reflect purchaser demands, individuated desires and customer dissatisfaction.
They are also up-ending rhetoric to make their weaker argument the stronger.
Their 1% rhetoric was up-ended by the 99% “we of: “We are the 99%.” From the
oldest to the youngest participant at Occupy, the only open and sustaining collec-
tive that had behaved as a protagonist in their lifetimes was the Market. But the
Occupy collective was different; it remained open and sustaining while it rhetori-
cally provoked the protagonist the Market has become. In doing so, it publically
performed a new alternative to the collective protagonist. In this, the performance
event is purely rhetorical—the showing of an argument—rather than performing
change, yet it is still transformative as it transformed the weaker argument into
the stronger.
PERFORMING AFFECT, SPACE AND EVENT
Occupy, as a new protagonist, jolted people out of their malaise by jabbing and
provoking them to fight for a society that respects itself and draws lines in the
sand against what is intolerable. Signs brandished by protesters emphasised this:
“Tax the F***ing Rich” —held by a pensioner of advanced years; “I lost my job,
and found an Occupation”—next to the tent of a middle-aged female; and “I am
here for my future”—written in shocking pink on the small placard of five year-
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old. All recorded spectator futility was challenged by a performance of virtuous
hedonistic rhetoric that granted spectators a space in which to be optimistic, in
the belief that one (or many) might be able to mitigate the existential pointless-
ness of it all through something. Recall the placard: “This is the 1st time I have
felt hopeful in a very long time.” There was hope, but there was anger, too.
Capitalism in the neo-liberal state ingrains a hierarchy in which “want” ide-
ologically supersedes “need” to such a degree as to constitute desire as virtuous
(as discussed above with “we want”, “we need”). The false certainty of this for-
mulation was revealed when austerity measures hit so many whose lives were
already precarious. The response that followed was anger over being misled (by
the banks, by government, etc.) and anger too—especially for the left—over let-
ting it happen. The trinity of precarity, nostalgia and anger creates what Stiegler
calls “disaffection”, which, put another way, is “the loss of psychic individuation.
“Disaffection leading to withdrawal is the loss of social individuation, which
in our hyper-industrial epoch”xxxviii threatens those most who are already dis-
turbed or disrupted. Stiegler speaks of a psychic pain, one that he conceptualises
unilaterally as a symbolic misery stemming from late capitalism, which leads ir-
resistibly to spiritual misery. Low and high-level disaffection are the elephant in
the room that Occupy’s slogan—“We are the 99%”—references, and in so do-
ing it creates a social space of potentiality through a kind of anti-performance.
The potentiality in the rhetoric of this slogan is recognition and with recognition,
Fraser explains, it is possible to develop a three-dimensional framing of justice
for the demonstrators, as it brings the pillar of cultural affect into play with the
pillars of the economic and the political dimensions.xxxix Added to this are the in-
creased stress levels accompanying global austerity. Stress in austerity confuses
and frustrates, but ultimately it fuels anger: “Political rhetoric is often about stok-
ing up real rage amongst a certain group in society; mild displeasure, let us recall,
does not start a revolution.”xl This rage performs as participation in the argument
for a more materialist rhetoric in which the maps of power are redrawn as object
and method.
The staging of Occupy is playful in that it was both a spectacle and the in-
tention to seek spectacle. Equally, it was ironic as its intent was to provoke via
the anarchy of sabotage and trespass. The very occupation of the space around
St. Paul’s in London performed an ironic inversion of the rhetoric of squatting,
immediately following the Parliamentary decision to curtail this historic right.
Squatting, in Britain, is historically tied to land tenure disputes first debated in
the early peasant revolts pre-17th century, which came to urban areas in the 19th
century. It was illegal to trespass on a very few (largely military) sites, but else-
where and until 2012, squatting was not a crime as it did not involve the state,
rather it was a civil matter; in law it was a tort not a crime. In the summer of
2011, Occupyists bedded down in a brazen, riotous colourful performance of a
right (squatting) that they both had and then suddenly did not have. Their very
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presence enacted a rhetorical conversation on the intolerance the government had
of their citizen’s rights to assemble and made visible their discontent in doing so.
Three months into the Occupation, the Conservative Government enacted leg-
islation that made squatting in residential buildings a crime punishable by law.
Its passage through the House of Commons happened when defences were down
and after two years of a slow drip-feed of conservative anti-squatting publicity
siphoned out via the free national papers. The change in the law removed from
its people an ancient rite of individual freedom. Since this ruling, squatting in
commercial dwellings has also come under scrutiny, largely due to the occupa-
tion of public buildings and squares that began with St. Paul’s. The excuse for
this scrutiny by hard-liners such the as the author of the bill—Mr. Weatherly MP
for Hove & Portslade—is the insurance risk that the occupation of a public or
commercial property would entail. Risk Assessment Strategy is neoliberalism’s
way of administrating Governance—whose dilemma is one of monetary and mar-
ketable risk: the risk that an insurance company will not pay out if property is
damaged by the public’s presence; the risk that a member of the public (albeit
protesting) may get injured and have just cause to sue; the risk that egress is
blocked, which limits footfall therefore impinging market trade, etc. It is per-
formatively tragic that the acts of Occupyists in St. Paul’s were unintentionally
prescient: in their desire to make their weaker voice heard, Occupation became
preoccupation and they failed to see what effect it was having on their theatre
craft in the longer term.
Participation in Occupy as a movement invited what Endres and Senda-
Cook term “place as rhetoric” because the places of performance—of Occu-
pation—themselves were “rhetorical tactics in movements towards social
change.”xli Further, these authors claim Occupyists incorporated the very rhetori-
cal use of place and space in performance protest as part of their epistemological
language. Countering the claim that rhetoricians have yet to examine the aspect
of place and space in social movement performances, Endres and Senda—Cook
wrote about place as a performer. With Occupy, places of occupation, constituent
and spectating bodies—and words exchanged—all interact to create a new lan-
guage of protest.
Following Endres and Senda-Cook, I argue that the space of occupation, the
bodies that occupy and the words and slogans deployed together form a rhetorical
challenge to the neoliberal condition. This new rhetoric of protest forms and com-
municates as an Event at the right time, which is a classical sophistic component
of rhetoric. To clarify, when I use the word “event” I mean both a performative
event and Event in the Badiouian sense. Badiou’s “Event” names the ruptures in
history and he is committed to philosophising on the subject that emerges out of
these ruptures. Particularly in terms of the encounter and its subjective truth, I am
compelled by the general rule that is the foundation of Badiouian Event theory,
Essays in Philosophy 16(1)
51
that “truth has its origin in an event. Badiou subjectivises truth and situates an
Event (with a capital “E”) as something that triggers the/a truth Event.
Something must happen, in order for there to be something new. Even in
our personal lives, “there must be an encounter, there must be something that
cannot be calculated, predicted or managed, there must be a break based only
on chance.”xlii This theory “helps us think about the ways in which places and
‘truths’, as well as the people in them, are always in the process of becom-
ing,”xliii and I use this to buttress the porosity of Occupy as a rhetorical event
that is always and already in the process of becoming, which is—in and of
itself—transformational. The Occupyist feels compelled to perform an occupa-
tion—the squatting of a building, etc.—as an intervention because their dilemma
is one of morality over their ethical subject breaking with the socialised reality
of late capitalism and, as Douzinas reminds us, “[e]very time ethical subjectivity
breaks with social reality, resistance and rebellion return.”xliv As Mark Fisherxlv
terms it, “Capitalist Realisms” are interpolated and resisted by the individual and
by the collective. Thus the rhetorical performances I have been referring to were
affective to both the individual and the group. I concur with Boon and Head, that
in order to break the cycle of domination in advanced capitalism “a new meta-
physical and epistemological language is needed – a language that does away
both with Kant’s distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms as
well as Hegel’s notion of Absolute Spirit.”xlvi As with Endres and Selma-Cook’s
argument, we are thus called to think anew about how Occupy performs its
rhetoric in such a way that interpolation and resistance are performed as process.
This, again, is what I see as both democratic and transformational in Occupy.
CONCLUSION
Occupy provided an open space in which the affected neoliberal subject paused,
collected itself and spoke: “We are the 99% and we have moral authority.” Its
form performed a resistance to neoliberalism—sometimes in Guy Fawkes Masks
and sometimes learning in a tent. Yet, it is important to reference the neolib-
eral containment in which the protest sat: Acts of disobedient squatting, but for
whom? Their protest was of an exclusion that their camps, nonetheless, relied
upon. Shared anger at social inequality for what purpose and for whose benefit?
In purging their anger the individual Occupyist enacted a neoliberalism itself,
which is to say that it needs to be for all who inhabit it, but in this paradigm
the subject is centred and self-sufficient. Performance of protest, but for whom?
Surely repeated performances of Occupy-protest, in and of itself, risks becoming
hegemonic or what Douzinas has called “ghostly normative” in that everyone,
now, has the right to “the Event.”
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The top-down, hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism leads to the inevitable
manipulation between hegemony, discourse and performance. In a world where
everything is for sale, their performances were actively being recorded for pos-
terity and were being preserved—marketized, repackaged and sold—before the
camps were dismantled in collections (Museum of Londonxlvii), via oral history
projects (Occupy Oral Historyxlviii), in the memorialisation of their sites (Occupy
London Toursxlix), in works of art (Occupy Artl), and dramaturgy such as If You
Don’t Let us Dream, We Won’t Let You Sleep.li
This dramatization of Occupy is a particularly salient example of such provo-
cation with which to conclude. Collaboratively devised, it premiered at the Royal
Court’s Jerwood Space in late February of 2013 to good reviews, yet one has to
question the utility of an anti-capitalist play that was offered as a limited run per-
formance at £35 a ticket (or perhaps this audience demographic was its target?).
What this reveals is the inability of Occupy to ever be in control of its recep-
tion and its intent that it was never concerned with doing so. It also emphasises
the ambiguities between neoliberal hegemony, rhetorical discourse and Event.
Clearly, the ideology and aesthetic of Occupy, sets personalised and public per-
formances of politics at a volatile juncture. The movement and its concomitant
acts of occupation behave as a vector: the point of application of a force mov-
ing through a space at a given velocity in a given direction. The concept has no
subject or object other than itself. It was an idea performed as an act, albeit a
nomadic disruptive one, that indicated and perpetuated motion from others. Oc-
cupy was and is a communal nomadic protagonist for change occupying a stage
in the public realm.lii The promise of the movement’s rhetoric continues to fill
spaces that otherwise seem un-fillable. It conveyed to its audience a conception
of philosophy that was an inherent form of public discourse both in terms of its
group practice and its group performance product. This is what was ultimately at
stake for the Occupyists: this concept of coming together, not the performance of
it necessarily, but the idea that it needed to be.
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